Specialty training as an incentive to retain doctors in Malawi: Discrete Choice Experiment

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Johns Hopkins Project/


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- > Specialty training likely to be incentive
- >Yet all types of training may not be valued equally
- **➤**Unpack value of specialty training in retention

Systematic literature review

- Importance of non-financial incentives
- ➤ Postgraduate training particularly valued by health workers

Mandeville et al. BMC Health Services Research 2014; 14:367

Semi-structured interviews with doctors

Semi-structured interviews with key

informants

I don't think I would die a happy doctor if I don't become a specialist

- ➤ Importance of specialising
- ➤ Low status of Malawian-based training
- Low uptake of training places in certain specialties

I can tell you for a fact that we are still failing to fill a lot of the posts. So, there are some posts that, or places, that are fully funded and I can cite anaesthesia, we haven't had anybody for I think the past two years...another area is ophthalmology.

I think our own registrars feel a sort of inferiority and they do want to get the South African exams as well. They somehow feel that that validates them. And I think it's a shame.




Discrete choice experiment (DCE)

- Quantitative methodology for eliciting preferences
- Services/goods/states can be described by essential characteristics

 → Value to an individual is derived from combination of these attributes
- Participants are asked to choose between hypothetical descriptions
 made up of different combinations of attributes
- · Choices reveal trade-offs between different attributes
- Preferences can inform development of health services or policy





Sample

- Recent graduates who had not yet started (i.e. made a choice over) postgraduate training.
- Excluded
 - Non-Malawian citizens
 - Undergraduate training outside Malawi
- Eligible = 153/279
- August 2012 March 2013
- Response rate 96.7% (149/153)





DCE analysis


- Choices form dependent variable in a "choice model"
- Levels of attributes form independent variables
- Latent class model
 - Underlying classes of participants with similar preferences
 - Membership characterised by unobserved (latent) variables
 - Latent variables inferred through observed variables
 - Observed variables incorporated into model



Results

- Four groups of participants with distinct preferences
- Characterised as:
 - "Rich rejecters" (frequently rejected jobs, higher mean salary)
 - > "Stubborn specialists" (strongest specialty preferences, most dissatisfaction with training all in Malawi or longer time before training)
 - "Money motivated" (largest preference for salary increases, more dependents)
 - "Pliant patriots" (scored higher on specialty flexibility index, only group for which training all outside Africa or in ophthalmology did not influence choices)
- Preferences can be leveraged by policymakers to maximise public sector retention





Results

Junior doctors would need to be paid an extra....


...MWK 39,000 - 85,000 (\$146 to \$318) per month to train all in Malawi ...MWK 215,000 - 355,000 (\$803 to \$1,326) per month to do ophthalmology


Junior doctors would work an extra...

 \dots 2 to 5 months for an additional MWK10,000 (\$37) in monthly salary

...1.3 to 8.5 years to train in a 1st choice core specialty







Conclusions

- Specialty training can be effective at retaining doctors
- But not all training is valued equally
- Health workers have distinct preferences that can be leveraged by policymakers for public sector retention



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